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Abstract 
Commonly depicted as one of the final frontiers, Mongolia has gained international notoriety since the turn of the 
millennium for the discovery of an extensive mineral resource base, estimated to hold over U.S. $1 trillion worth of 
mineral assets spread over 6000 sites (Campi, 2012). Mineral riches, however, have been shown to be as much a 
curse as a blessing for economic and social development (Auty, 2001; Humphreys et. al, 2007). Since the discovery 
of the Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold deposits in 2001, Mongolia has leap-frogged from a fairly low position on the 
mineral-dependence scale to being widely perceived as ‘especially vulnerable’ (Haglund, 2011) to the resource 
trap;  mineral exports comprised 89.2% of Mongolia’s total exports in 2011, up from 32.5% in 2000 (Mongolian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2011). In the case of Mongolia, the lack of a significant industrial base and 
high levels of poverty in a sparsely populated landlocked country have triggered the red flags of a potential 
resource trap in both domestic and international development governance circles (Isakova et. al, 2012; World 
Growth, 2008; Moran, 2013; Reeves, 2011; Barma et al., 2011). This paper will engage with some of the complexity 
of Mongolia’s emergence as a mineral-exporting economy and the government’s negotiation of a potential 
resource trap through committing a sufficient portion of mineral rents to economic diversification and public 
redistribution. While it is impossible and unhelpful to draw any fast conclusions about the long-term implications of 
an extractive development strategy for Mongolia, this article purposes to trouble the simplistic frame of “resource 
nationalism” that has been attached to Mongolia’s governance of Oyu Tolgoi.  
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Mongolia. This article is based on research conducted for her masters dissertation in 2013. 




1. Introduction: Oyu Tolgoi, Mongolia’s National Development Strategy and the 
Resource Trap Thesis 
Mongolia is the least densely populated country in the world; 2.7 million people live in a 
landlocked land mass approximately the size of Western Europe, almost 1.6 million square 
kilometres. In the early 1990s, Mongolia experienced a remarkable post-communist 
transformation with the collapse of the Soviet Union. While space constrains a full discussion 
of the particularities of Mongolia’s transformation in the wake of the crumbling Soviet Union, 
scholars at the time observed with fascination its remarkable “success” in adopting the full 
range of reforms for democratisation and marketisation required by the country’s acceptance 
of financial assistance from international financial institutions (IFIs). Though there is not space 
to do so here, scholars have gone to great effort to understand this surprising1 (Anderson et. al, 
2000; Kopstein and Reilly, 2000; Fish, 1998; Fish, 2001; Fritz, 2008) embrace of market 
democracy, analysing the manner and circumstances in which the traits of liberal market 
democracies – multi-party elections (Bayantur, 2008; Rossabi, 2005), high rates of public 
participation in political processes (Sabloff, 2002; Sumaadii, 2012) the separation of powers 
(Ginsberg, 2003), a written constitution (Sanders, 1992; Fish, 1996; Bedeski, 2006), human 
rights commitments (Landman et. al, 2005), privatisation (Korsun and Murrell, 1995), financial 
and trade liberalisation (Pomfret, 2000; Rossabi, 2005), and an active civil society (Bedeski, 
2006) – have come to characterise Mongolia. While some aspects of reform were implemented 
more thoroughly than others (Anderson et al., 2000), Mongolia’s transition has been widely 
perceived as an authentic process of democratisation and marketisation (Pomfret, 2000; Fritz, 
2008) in contrast to its Central Asian neighbours who have settled in the ‘foggy zone’ 
(Schedler, 2002: 37 quoted in Bayantur, 2008: 6; Kopstein and Reilly, 2000) as post-Soviet 
autocracies, exhibiting the qualities of neither socialist authoritarianism nor capitalist 
democracy as classically defined.  
One of the less successful – some would say catastrophic (Rossabi, 2005) – aspects of 
Mongolia’s transformation in the 1990s was the sharp decline in living standards: over a third 
of the population experienced a sudden plunge into abject poverty (Rossabi, 2005; Nixson and 
Walters, 2006; Sneath, 2003; UNDP, 2000; World Bank, 2006). Unfortunately, there has been 
no significant transformation in this area; a recent UNDP Human Development Report (2013: 
                                                             
1 Fish (1998: 127) argues that Mongolia had none of the historical, cultural or economic ‘pre-requisites’ which 
might explain its rapid adoption of democratic reforms; Anderson et. al (2000: 527) reinforce this perspective, 
arguing that ‘until 1990, this country had known only nomadism and socialism, theocracy, and communism.’ 
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5) states that ‘the intensity of deprivation – that is, the average percentage of deprivation 
experienced by people living in multi-dimensional poverty – in Mongolia was 41%.’ While 
Mongolia has never been considered a wealthy country, the communist government provided 
a strong safety net and high levels of education (Rossabi, 2005); social welfare comprised 40% 
of the communist government’s expenditure (ADB, 2008) and universal literacy had been 
achieved by the late 1980s. The economic shock of the collapsing Soviet Union and the sudden 
introduction of structural adjustment policies in the early 1990s through ‘shock therapy’ 
(Sachs, 1994; Klein, 2007) meant that real expenditure on health and education was reduced 
by 46% and 56% between 1990 and 1992 (Sneath, 2006: 149-150) and unemployment rose 
from 1.3% in 1989 to 20% in 1994 (World Bank, 1996; Rossabi, 2005). These statistics are 
really only scratching the surface in terms of indicating the social and economic upheaval 
experienced by Mongolians during the early 1990s, and in fact probably obscure the actual 
extent of change in social reality (Rossabi, 2005; Sneath, 2003). For example, the fact that 80% 
of the population are recorded as employed obscures the reality that the rural population 
doubled between 1990 and 1997 to comprise over a third of the total population and half of the 
working population as many urban Mongolians returned to herding to find subsistence in a 
contracting economy (Mearns, 2004). Thus, while the working population was recorded at 
80%, half of this number was comprised of new herders seeking subsistence, which was a risky 
and precarious mode of employment in the transition years given the extensive deregulation of 
the pastoral economy (Mearns, 2004; Sneath, 2003; Upton 2010; Upton 2012).2  
Mongolia emerged from the 1990s with a highly liberalised, investment-oriented economy, a 
narrow industrial base and a scaled-back, uneven welfare distribution system (Nixson and 
Walters, 2006). While GDP growth was sluggish – hovering between 1-3% annually (World 
Bank Data, 2013) – and little progress had been made in terms of reducing poverty (UNDP, 
2000), Mongolia was poised for investment into its natural resources in the early years of the 
new millennium. As Dierkes (2012: 3) argues, Mongolia’s proximity to the Chinese market, 
democratic governance structures and well-educated, young workforce, not to mention its 
liberal regulation of mining activities, made Mongolia’s natural resources an attractive prospect 
for mining companies. This external foreign interest coincided with the policy expectation that 
                                                             
2 For example, as a result of two successive dzuds – extreme winters – in 1999 and 2000, many of the “new” 
herders who had migrated to the countryside in the early 1990s moved to urban centres, particularly challenging 
the infrastructural capacity of Ulaanbaatar, the capital city. See UNDP, 2000: 9.  
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the exploitation of natural resources would be Mongolia’s main vehicle for development 
(Tumenbayer, 2002).   
Consequently, from the perspective of the Mongolian government, the 2001 discovery of the 
extensive Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold deposits in the southern Gobi region signified a turning 
point in terms of the country’s role in the global economy in finding a natural resource base 
and, critically, an opportunity to finally shake the poverty that had shadowed the 1990s. In 
addition to the 2001 Southern Oyu discovery, three additional deposits were discovered (2002-
2008) which comprise the current Oyu Tolgoi mining complex (Rio Tinto, 2013; Kohn and 
Humber, 2013). In addition to immense gold deposits,3 Oyu Tolgoi is now estimated to contain 
46 billion pounds of copper, with additional inferred sources estimated at 55 billion pounds 
(Turquoise Hill Resource, 2013). The impact of the investment from the Oyu Tolgoi 
exploration was swift: the mineral sector’s share of GDP grew from 10% in 2002 to 33% in 
2007 (Combellick-Bidney, 2012: 273). While it was no surprise that Mongolia had vast copper 
and gold reserves (Dierkes, 2012), the concentration of this mineral wealth within one mining 
area and under the auspices of one licensed company suggests that Oyu Tolgoi marked a 
turning point for Mongolia in terms of engaging with large-scale, long-term foreign investment 
(Macnamara, 2012). Oyu Tolgoi (“Turquoise Hill”) is now one of the world’s largest gold and 
copper mines, and its investment agreement is the largest in Mongolia’s history (Oyu Tolgoi 
LLC, 2013). Oyu Tolgoi is estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to boost 
Mongolia’s GDP by 35% by 2021 with over U.S. $6.2 billion invested between 2006 and 2013 
in the first phase of construction (Rio Tinto, 2013). The operational life of the mine is projected 
to be at least 59 years (Fisher et al., 2011: 20), which has the potential to dramatically affect 
Mongolia’s long-term economic trajectory.  
The introduction of a new development strategy in 2007 – the ‘MDG-Based Comprehensive 
Development Strategy for Mongolia 2007-2021’ (NDS) – reflects the heightened development 
aspirations inspired by the discovery of Oyu Tolgoi. The NDS heightens the expectations of 
development from the 1990s to the ambitious goal of achieving the status of a middle-income 
country with an industrialised knowledge-based economy, and a high standard of human 
development based on the MDGs by 2021 (Mongolia, 2007). The language of the NDS, 
however, does not simply reflect the rhetoric of the international MDG development agenda; 
                                                             
3 Oyu Tolgoi is estimated to contain 25 million ounces of gold in measured and indicated sources, and a further 
37 million ounces in inferred sources. See Turquoise Hill Resources, 2013.   
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its vision is linked from the outset of the document to the increased capacity of the Mongolian 
economy in light of ‘mineral deposits of strategic importance,’ (Mongolia, 2007: 5) a catch-
phrase associated with the discovery of Oyu Tolgoi. The NDS contains a clear policy shift with 
specific development targets to undergird these heightened aspirations, evidently based on 
optimistic forecasts for economic performance.  
For example, the first and second priority areas (Mongolia, 2007: 5) to 1.) ‘provide for all-
round development of the Mongolian people’ and 2.) ‘intensively develop export-oriented, 
private sector-led, high technology-driven manufacturing and services to create a sustainable, 
knowledge-based economy’ relies upon the critical third: to ‘exploit mineral deposits of 
strategic importance, generate and accumulate savings, ensure intensive and high economic 
growth, and develop modern processing industry.’ The priorities of the NDS and the goal of 
achieving middle-income country status by 2021 – notably the year Oyu Tolgoi is expected to 
reach full production (Rio Tinto, 2013) – would seem exaggerated unless the Mongolian 
government had reason to believe that the profits of resource extraction would be sufficient to 
diversify the economy and dramatically improve social welfare across the entire population. 
While the NDS suggests an optimistic sense of the development opportunity of mineral 
exploitation for Mongolia, the priorities placed upon economic diversification and effective 
distribution also suggests that Mongolia’s leaders recognised the serious risks associated with 
development strategies based on mineral extraction.  
The “resource trap” is a widely recognised thesis in development literature that problematises 
the puzzle of ‘skewed economies’ and public impoverishment in many countries with extensive 
natural wealth (Collier, 2007; Humphreys et al., 2007; Auty, 2000; Auty, 2001; Bebbington et 
al., 2008; Rosser, 2006). The signs of a country at risk of a resource trap are exhibited in an 
impeded inability, known as Dutch Disease, to invest in other economic sectors beyond primary 
extraction, particularly in value-adding secondary sectors such as manufacturing or processing 
(Humphreys et al., 2007). The risk of overspecializing in one industry or commodity sector at 
the expense of others is heightened because the quantity of resource revenues combined with 
the timing of the earnings can lead to income volatility (Humphreys et al., 2007: 6). Income 
volatility, according to Humphreys et. al (2007: 6), is due to three distinct problems associated 
with extractive industries: ‘the variation over time in rates of extraction, the variability in the 
timing of payments by corporations to states, and fluctuations in the value of the natural 
resource produced.’ The national income volatility that results from impeded diversification 
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tends to have a correlative impact on distribution. As Bebbington et al. (2008: 888) points out, 
‘mining has [been] associated with spectacularly unequal distributions of wealth.’ Unless a 
country has very rigorous transparency policies in place, mineral rents have been shown to be 
very amenable to elite capture (Auty and de Soysa, 2005). However, the distribution of wealth 
is not simply a question of corruption. It is difficult for governments, particularly those laden 
with debt, to make long-term human development or welfare commitments because of the 
boom-and-bust cycle of commodity value and income (Humphreys et al., 2007: 8; Frankel, 
2010). The revenues gained from “boom” periods often disappear in the short-term to finance 
the “bust” phase of the cycle, particularly in cases where further debt obligations are incurred 
on expenditures made in the boom phase (Frankel, 2010). This vicious cycle has been shown 
to lead to declining social spending and rising inequality with a knock-on impact on democracy, 
as the inability of the state to fulfil its promises tends to erode public trust in the efficacy of 
government (Stiglitz, 2007; Auty and de Soysa, 2005).  
The author will use the resource trap thesis as the starting point for the following analysis 
because it highlights the tension between opportunity and risk underlying any economic 
development strategy based on mineral extraction. The macroeconomic challenges of 
diversification and distribution, then, can be appropriately understood within the particulars of 
the Mongolian context. The author hopes that this piece will aid in the illumination of 
Mongolia’s governance of Oyu Tolgoi, considering both the government’s commitments to its 
public and the role of international finance and investment into the project. 
2. The Discovery of Oyu Tolgoi: “Deposits of Strategic Interest” and Reform of the 1997 
Minerals Law 
The Oyu Tolgoi deposits were discovered under the provisions of the 1997 Minerals Law, 
which incentivised foreign direct investment (FDI) into Mongolia’s mining sector by 
establishing low barriers to prospecting, exploring and mining for minerals (Tumenbayer, 
2002: 5; World Bank, 2005; Sukhbaatar, 2012: 139). The 1997 Minerals Law had a ‘high 
positive profile’ (World Growth, 2009: 5-6) with foreign and domestic investors; a World 
Growth (2009: 5-6) report states that ‘mineral exploration increased five-fold between 2001 
and 2006’ as a direct result of Mongolia’s legal framework which was apparently almost on 
par with ‘international best practice,’ with favourable tax and royalty rates. It guaranteed the 
investing company a stability agreement with the government so that changes in national law 
regarding tax rates or royalty regimes would not affect their investment (Sukhbaatar, 2012: 
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139). Additionally, the 1997 Minerals Law stipulated that the state could not participate directly 
as a stakeholder in mining or exploration. The license-holder had many rights and few 
obligations: it had the right to gain any number of further licenses, sell its products at 
international prices on both domestic and international markets, as well as having “right of 
way” through adjacent land in use or owned by others (1997 Minerals Law, Articles 13 and 
16).  
Proponents of FDI-lead economic development strongly suggest that the benefits of Oyu 
Tolgoi would have been far larger had the 1997 Minerals Law remained unchanged and the 
2004 stability agreement between Ivanhoe Mines and the Mongolian government kept intact 
(World Growth, 2009: 8-9). The Mongolian government, however, decided that the Oyu Tolgoi 
was a ‘mineral deposit of strategic importance’ (Mongolia, 2006)4 and accordingly adjusted 
the 1997 Minerals Law in 2006 in order to negotiate for a specific Oyu Tolgoi investment 
agreement (OTIA, Article 5.4). 
2006 marked a turning point for Mongolia’s engagement with investment into its mineral 
sector. The 1997 Minerals Law was amended in July 2006 to give the Mongolian government 
greater influence in the negotiation of mining investment agreements by permitting the 
government to hold a direct stake – up to 34% - in ‘nationally strategic deposits.’ The 2006 
reforms enabled the government to seek an individual investment agreement with an investor, 
where more conditions could be placed upon the investment than under the former stability 
agreement model (Mongolia, 2006). Additionally, a Windfall Profits tax was introduced in 
May 2006 to reap increased revenue when market prices exceeded certain limits. Both the 
Windfall Profits tax and the amendments to the Minerals Law were popular among the 
Mongolian public, following widespread concern over land rights and long-term leases for 
foreign mining companies and in particular, Ivanhoe Mines.5 According to Sukhbaatar (2012), 
the public pressure on the government in early 2006 was mainly concentrated on changing the 
law so that the state could have a greater advantage in large-scale mining projects and 
demanding greater distribution of mining revenue to the public. It is interesting to note the 2006 
                                                             
4 According to the revised Minerals Law (Mongolia, 2006: Article 4.1.11), deposits are considered nationally 
strategic if they might affect national security, the social and economic development of the country and/or if 
they have the potential to produce over 5% of annual GDP.  
5 A well-known anecdote from the civic unrest over Oyu Tolgoi in the early days of negotiations was the 
burning of an effigy of Ivanhoe’s founder, Robert Friedland, in April 2006; Robert Friedland had a reputation 
for an alleged ‘trail of environmental wreckage’ left by his operations. Notably, Rio Tinto took over the 
management of Oyu Tolgoi in 2006 by acquiring a 51% share of Ivanhoe Mines. See New Internationalist 
Magazine, 2006.   
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shifts in legal regulation which preceded the introduction of the ambitious NDS in 2007. Rather 
than relying on a relatively unregulated market economy to spontaneously catalyse economic 
development, the NDS articulates an aspiration for a more rigorous regulatory framework for 
large-scale mining investment in order to capture the most revenue for Mongolia to diversify 
its economy, increase welfare expenditure and repay the high level of national debt (Mongolia, 
2007). 
While these changes received support from Mongolian citizens and civil society, , investors 
and the broader financial community strongly criticised these legislative manoeuvres as 
indicative of a trend towards resource nationalism (Packard and Khurelbold, 2010). The 
‘protectionist’ (Adams, 2012: 4) adjustments to the Minerals Law and the introduction of the 
Windfall Profits tax in 2006 were perceived as a part of a renationalisation of Mongolia’s 
mining sector (Sukhbaatar, 2012; Macnamara, 2012). In particular, the Windfall Profits Tax 
was seen to undermine the stability of the rule of law in Mongolia (Sukhbaatar, 2012). This 
perspective reflects a particular liberal conception of the rule of law (Jayasuriya, 1999: 2) where 
the strengthening of the rule of law is correlated with the ‘weakening of governmental or public 
power.’ Despite heated opinions on both sides on the controversial Windfall Profits Tax, 
Sukhbaatar (2012: 142) argues that ‘it is difficult to pass judgment on the tax law,’ given that 
the requirements of the rule of law – ie, generality, public knowledge, prospective application 
– were fulfilled and Mongolia was technically using its sovereign prerogative to determine its 
taxation framework, a view that was affirmed in a United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration tribunal between a Russian mining company and 
Mongolia (Usoskin, 2011). Sukhbaatar critically notes that the point of contention lies in the 
policy, rather than legal, perspective: ‘Mongolia may have hurt its reputation among foreign 
investors by succumbing to short-term gains from temporary commodity price increases’ 
(Sukhbaatar, 2012: 142). The revised Minerals Law passed in July 2006 was less controversial, 
particularly from the view of investors, because it still provided a long-term, stable framework 
for investment agreements despite reneging on some of the more liberal provisions of the 1997 
law (Sukhbaatar, 2012).6 
                                                             
6 Four critical revisions of the 2006 Minerals law are as follows: 1.) the state maintains the right to a 34% stake 
in a privately-discovered mineral deposits, 2.) mining licenses are granted for an initial thirty years and can be 
renewed twice for twenty years each, 3.) the rights of access to adjoining land is subject to the approval of the 
‘owner or possessor’ of the land, and 4.) mineral deposits are classified as strategic, common or conventional 
(Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement, 2009). 
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3. The Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement 
In October 2009, after five years of negotiations, the Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement 
(OTIA) was signed by the Mongolian government, Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe Mines (now 
Turquoise Hill Resources). The Mongolian government emerged with a 34% stake, giving it 
three seats on the governing board of Oyu Tolgoi LLC. It determined stabilised tax rates and a 
zero rate for Value-Added Tax (VAT) for specified goods and services related to Oyu Tolgoi, 
in addition to the freedom of the foreign investor to repatriate export earnings (OTIA, Articles 
2.1 and 2.18). It also gave the foreign investor the rights to avail itself of lower tax rates if they 
existed in applicable international or double-taxation treaties (OTIA, Article 2.2.7). In turn the 
foreign investor committed to a range of initiatives to ‘support socio-economic development 
policies...to ensure that sustainable benefits from the OT Project reach Mongolian people, 
including people in Umnogovi aimag’ (OTIA, Article 4.5).  
The social provisions set out in Chapter Four of the OTIA particularly place a large proportion 
of onus directly upon the investor to guarantee local and regional opportunities, particularly in 
Umnogovi aimag, consistent with the goals of NDS to reduce rural-urban inequalities and 
create thriving townships around Oyu Tolgoi. As part of the agreement, the Investor further 
committed to contribute U.S. $126 million (Rio Tinto, 2013) for a five-year training and 
education project, in addition to showing preference for Mongolian employees. The OTIA also 
requires that the power for Oyu Tolgoi be sourced from Mongolia after five years of operation, 
and any smelter for processing the extracted metal is to be located domestically as well. The 
terms of the OTIA seem to indicate that the Mongolian government strategically used its 34% 
stake in the deposits to negotiate an agreement that goes beyond revenue accumulation; the 
OTIA requires that the principal Investors actively assist in diversifying Mongolia’s economy, 
as well as provide socio-economic development opportunities and benefits for Mongolian 
citizens. 
Joseph Stiglitz (2007), an influential economist, has cautioned countries with natural resources 
to make sure they have a strong institutional framework in place before commencing resource 
exploitation, because of the risks to diversification and distribution associated with income 
volatility. While the exploitation of Oyu Tolgoi was already underway, Mongolia made 
significant progress after signing the OTIA in terms of establishing the appropriate institutions 
to enable diversification and equitable distribution. In November 2009, the Human 
Development Fund (HDF) replaced the Mongolian Development Fund (est. 2007) ‘to 
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counteract rising inequality and distribute the benefits of the mining boom more broadly’ 
(OTIA, 2009: 10). The state is supposed to allocate a portion of revenue to the HDF each year 
based on expected earnings from mineral dividends, royalties and taxation (OTIA, 2009; 
Campi, 2012). It was primarily designed as an ongoing ‘cash transfer mechanism,’ (Campi 
2012; Moran, 2013) in addition to funding education initiatives and social services. According 
to Campi (2013), the HDF was a legal milestone for the Mongolian public, as it enshrined 
‘equal eligibility’ for each citizen to share in the country’s mineral wealth.  
To generate savings and prevent reliance on volatile mineral prices, the Mongolian Parliament 
passed the Fiscal Stability Law in 2010 and the Integrated Budget Law in 2011 (World Bank 
Group Mongolia, 2013; Isakova et al., 2012). These laws have the combined effect of capping 
the deficit and public debt at 2% and 40% of GDP respectively, keeping expenditure in line 
with the growth rate of Mongolia’s non-mineral GDP, and constraining the power of parliament 
to influence the state budget (Ognon, 2013). Notably, the 40% cap on public debt only starts in 
2014 (Ognon, 2013). According to an EBRD working paper, the Fiscal Stability Law crucially 
included the introduction of a ‘transparent formula for copper price projections’ (Isakova et al., 
2012: 15) to help the Mongolian government anticipate the boom and bust cycle of this 
commodity market. Finally, the Fiscal Stability Law established the Fiscal Stability Fund (FSF) 
to accumulate ‘excess commodity-related revenues’ (Isakova et al., 2012) from boom phases 
in order to supplement financial losses experienced in bust phases of the cycle. 
In its recommendations to Mongolia, the EBRD (Isakova et al., 2012: 15) has strongly advised 
that fiscal frameworks designed to capture maximum revenue from natural resource 
exploitation are ‘arguably the most critical weapon’ to defend against the resource trap. The 
passing of budgetary and fiscal laws in conjunction with establishment of the Human 
Development Fund and the Fiscal Stability Fund suggests that the Mongolian government is 
serious in taking the institutional and legal steps necessary to side-step a resource trap, 
following the general consensus that institutional strength is key to its prevention (Humphreys 
et al, 2007; Stiglitz, 2007; IMF, 2012; World Bank Group Mongolia, 2013). Both IMF and the 
World Bank advisors have praised the efforts of the Mongolian government in relation to its 
institutions (World Bank Mongolia 2013; IMF 2013), while urging for ongoing improvement 
in this area. The question remains, however, if institutional strengthening and legal frameworks 
are sufficient to prevent a resource trap. There are two critical factors to consider. Firstly, what 
exactly are the financial obligations of the Mongolian government in regard to its 34% stake in 
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Oyu Tolgoi? Secondly, and relatedly, how viable is Mongolia’s fiscal stability framework 
given these obligations, its debt burden and the volatility of mineral prices?  
4. The Rubber Hits the Road for Oyu Tolgoi 
In addition to emphasising the importance of institutional strength, Stiglitz (2007) goes on to 
warn governments against entering into complex contracts with foreign investors whose 
bottom-line, as expected, is profit. The basic assumption of the Comprehensive National 
Development Strategy (NDS) is that the exploitation of natural resources in the short-term will 
produce enough savings for Mongolia to reach middle-income country status by 2021, the same 
year that Oyu Tolgoi is supposed to reach full production (Rio Tinto, 2013). Is this assumption 
realistic? The government has stressed to the public that the private stakeholders are 
internalising the fiscal risk of the project; the Minister of Finance, S. Bayartsogt, stated in a 
televised public debate on the OTIA that ‘Mongolia acquired 34% equity free of charge... 
Mongolia has made a very good bargain’ (Mongolian Mining Journal, 14th November 2011). 
However, one of the less understood complexities of the OTIA is that the Mongolian 
government is actually required to finance its 34% stake in the mine (White, 2013), taking 
financial responsibility alongside Turquoise Hill Resources and Rio Tinto for all expenditures. 
If it is unable to invest its own capital, the Mongolian government has the “flexibility” to fund 
its equity share by accepting a loan from the private stakeholders (White, 2013). However, 
there is a catch: as a common – vs. preferred – stakeholder, the Mongolian government has to 
settle its debt obligations before it can recoup profits.7 Mongolia accepted a loan from Rio 
Tinto, expecting dividends from the mine to begin in 2019 in addition to royalty and taxation 
revenue in the meantime (Zand, 2013).  
Given these financial obligations, the Mongolian government expressed deep concern in 2013 
over the alleged U.S. $2 billion in cost overruns incurred by Rio Tinto (Riseborough and Kohn, 
2013), which threatens to seriously delay the expected flow of dividends from the mine. A 
recent article quoted the Head of Planning at the Mining Ministry as estimating that it will be 
twenty or thirty years before Mongolia shares the profits of Oyu Tolgoi (Zand, 2013; see also 
Kohn and Mellor, 2013). The Mongolian government halted the first shipments of copper in 
June 2013 over its ’22 Points of Dispute’ (Els, 2013) with Rio Tinto; the World Bank has 
                                                             
7 As Rio Tinto holds the principal share of Oyu Tolgoi, it acts as a preferred stakeholder; Turquoise Hill 
Resources and the Mongolian Government are required to settle their debt obligations before recouping profits 
as common stakeholders (White, 2013). 
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advised that any further delays will have ‘significant adverse impacts’ (World Bank Group – 
Mongolia, 2013: 8) on Mongolia’s foreseeable economic growth. Also of concern to the 
government is the U.S. $5.1 billion financing package required for the second phase of mine 
construction (Riseborough and Kohn, 2013), where 80% of the mineral resource lies (Rio 
Tinto, 2013). These concerns regarding cost over-runs and further financing pose substantial 
challenges for Mongolia’s budget and debt burden, and crucially, the viability of its fiscal 
stabilisation framework designed to capture revenue for diversification and distribution.   
The little-known complexity of Mongolia’s financing obligations has the potential to 
undermine Mongolia’s fiscal stability framework. Critically, it is important to determine to 
what extent Mongolia’s trending pattern of fiscal spending is symptomatic of institutional 
failure or the conditions of the OTIA itself. The condition of “debt repayment before dividends” 
incentivises Mongolia to assume more debt in the short-term to fund the infrastructure and 
construction costs required by the project in order to make it profitable more quickly (White, 
2013; World Bank Group Mongolia, 2013). Given the location of Oyu Tolgoi in the Gobi 
desert, transport and energy infrastructure [see Map 1] are urgently needed but costs are high. 
While it seems positive that Mongolia can fund its equity stake in the project by investing in 
infrastructure which will hopefully have diversification benefits, Mongolia could still easily 
spiral into a resource trap if the government gets into the cycle of overspending on the basis of 
anticipated profits (White, 2013).  




When the boom in global copper prices coincided with the Fiscal Stability Law in 2010, the 
government expanded its expenditure far above the stipulated 2% GDP deficit ceiling. While 
the Fiscal Stability Fund did generate capital from 2011-2012 due to high commodity prices 
and significant investment flows (Isakova et al., 2012), its U.S. $300 million asset stock was a 
fraction of the revenue needed to expand infrastructure. For example, the rail infrastructure 
required to export mineral ore to Russia and China is estimated to cost U.S. $3 billion (Isakova 
et al., 2012: 10).  Unfortunately, it seems that Mongolia has succumbed to a ‘pro-cyclical’ 
(World Bank Group Mongolia, 2013: 5) model of expenditure to uphold its equity obligations 
through investing in large infrastructure projects, as evidenced by the public debt incurred 
through the Development Bank of Mongolia (DBM) and the Chinggis Bond.  
In 2011, the Mongolian government established the DBM through law ‘with a mandate to 
finance development projects’ (Isakova et al., 2012: 9). Parallel to the establishment of the 
fiscal stabilisation fund designed to store savings, the Mongolian government acquired 
significant debt through the DBM; the interest on these bonds was U.S. $15 million in 2012 
alone. The EBRD has cautioned the government to clarify the relationship between the MDB 
and the fiscal stability framework: it ‘creates an effective loophole...[that] allows the 
government to build up contingent liabilities that could offset accumulation of the FSF’ 
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(Isakova et al., 2012: 9). These concerns have not been addressed and the government has 
continued to acquire more debt through innovative means, as concessional loans from 
international donor agencies are being gradually phased out.8 For example, in November 2012 
Mongolia sold its first government bond, worth U.S. $1.5 billion in debt, on the international 
bond market to fund energy infrastructure and the Millennium Road project (Frangos and 
Natarajan, 2012). The recorded deficit in 2012 was the highest in thirteen years at 8.4% of 
GDP; the World Bank estimates that the addition of Mongolia’s accumulated debt through the 
DBM and the Chinggis bond could extend the total fiscal deficit to 13% (World Bank Group 
Mongolia, 2013: 4). [See Graph 1]  






It seems that Mongolia’s fiscal stabilisation framework, despite looking quite effective on 
paper, is impaired in practice because it goes against the grain of the OTIA incentive structure. 
In order for Mongolia to reap dividends from Oyu Tolgoi, both infrastructure investment and 
debt repayment are necessary. Given Mongolia’s debt obligations, this two-fold requirement 
begs the question as to whether stronger fiscal management is powerful enough for Mongolia 
to realise the profits of its 34% equity share, even in the long-term. 
5. 2012: The Year of the “Roaring Mouse”9 
The copper price “bust” in 2012 brought the implications of the OTIA’s fine-print home to 
roost for Mongolia, resulting in the introduction of the Strategic Entities Foreign Investment 
Law (SEFIL) in June 2012. Under SEFIL the Mongolian government attempted to renegotiate 
                                                             
8 Improved levels of economic development in Mongolia mean that formerly concessional loans are being 
increasingly being offered at market rates (World Bank Group Mongolia, 2013: 15).  
9 This sub-title plays on a recent Reuters (Deutsch and Edwards, 2013) article entitled ‘In Tax Case, Mongolia is 




the OTIA (World Bank Group Mongolia, 2013). Not only did Rio Tinto and Turquoise Hill 
reject this proposal, but it caused a 17% collapse in foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2012 
which spiralled to a 49% drop in 2013 (Els, 2013). Unfortunately for Mongolia, contract 
renegotiation was a red flag to other potential investors, and has significantly affected the 
perception of Mongolia as a “stable” destination for FDI. According to the World Bank, the 
loss of FDI is deeply significant for the productivity of the economy as it has been Mongolia’s 
main source of private investment in the past two years (World Bank Group Mongolia, 2013). 
In 2012, total revenue accumulated was 12.1% below the budget projection, with mineral 
revenue 35.6% below the previous year; total exports fell by 9% (World Bank Group Mongolia, 
2013: 4). Mongolia still experienced double-digit GDP growth in 2012 at 12.3%, but it is 
significantly less than the 17% boom “high” in 2011 (World Bank Group Mongolia, 2013: 8).  
While renegotiation of the OTIA was unsuccessful, the Mongolian government continued to 
challenge Rio Tinto through allegations of tax evasion. A recent report published by the Centre 
for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) suggests that Mongolia may be missing 
out on substantial tax revenue from Oyu Tolgoi. Rio Tinto maintains that U.S. $1.1 billion has 
been paid to the Mongolian government in taxes, fees and royalties (Rio Tinto, 2013), but the 
current debate centres specifically on the amount of withholding tax that should have been paid 
to the Mongolian government. According to the terms of the OTIA, a 20% withholding tax is 
supposed to be levied on dividends from the mine (Deutsch and Edwards, 2013). Drawing on 
the SOMO findings, a recent Reuters article (Deutsch and Edwards, 2013) argues that 
significant tax has not been paid, meaning that Mongolia could be missing out on billions of 
dollars in tax revenue. The Dutch holding company for Turquoise Hill subjects revenues from 
Oyu Tolgoi to a double-taxation treaty signed by Mongolia and the Netherlands in 2004. The 
article states that this treaty enables ‘Dutch-registered firms to channel income from dividends, 
royalties and interest earned in Mongolia through their Dutch company, so paying no 
withholding tax.’ As the Netherlands is infamous as a tax evasion location for multinational 
corporations (McGauran, 2013), Mongolia cancelled its double taxation treaty in September 
2012 after its requests for amendments to the double-taxation treaty were refused by the 
Netherlands.10 Rio Tinto maintains that this action will make no difference to ‘Oyu Tolgoi 
LLC’s use of the Dutch company’ or to its future tax payments, as the OTIA included the 
stabilization of all tax treaties current at the time of signing in 2009 (Deutsch and Edwards, 
                                                             
10 It also cancelled double taxation treaties with Luxembourg, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates to avoid 
the same problem in the future. See McGauran, 2013.  
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2013). While the Mongolian government is evidently taking bold steps to challenge tax 
evasion, it does cast a shadow of doubt over the common reassurance from analysts that tax 
revenues will be sufficient to counteract the effect of rising public debt (Frangos and Natarajan, 
2012). 
6. In Between a Rock and a Hard Place? The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment and 
the Prospects for Diversification and Distribution  
Given the complexity of putting ambitious policy on revenue accumulation into practice with 
Oyu Tolgoi, it is not too surprising that the economic diversification and welfare distribution 
expected from the project has been fairly disappointing so far. Manufacturing and construction 
has increased somewhat but due largely to a slump in commodity prices; the manufacturing 
industry as a percentage of GDP rose from 4% in 2009 to approximately 12% in 2012 (World 
Bank Group Mongolia, 2013).11 The long-term success of diversification depends upon the 
sustainability of its funding, which is considered low by fiscal experts given the scale of 
infrastructure required (Moody’s Investor Services, 2013). 
The 2012 “bust” in commodity prices decreased public expenditure from the HDF by 66% in 
2013 (Ognon, 2013), with spending on education dropping from 14.6% of GDP in 2009 to 
11.9% in 2011 (World Bank data, 2013). Inequality has continued to rise from the 1998 level 
to 0.365 on the Gini co-efficient (World Bank data, 2013). In light of bigger questions about 
the profitability of Oyu Tolgoi, the obligations in the OTIA on the foreign investors to 
contribute to Mongolia’s diversification and distribution seem negligible. If Mongolia 
continues to be afflicted by the symptoms of the resource trap in terms of its inability to collect 
or save sufficient revenue, 150 scholarships, support for small business and preferential 
employment for rural Mongolians will not be enough to achieve middle-income country status 
by 2021. In fact, the Mongolian government and civil society actors have recently accused Rio 
Tinto of reneging on its commitments in terms of the number of Mongolians employed in the 
mine, in addition to other concerns of over-spending and tax evasion (Stewart, 2013; 
Dugersuren, 2013). 
The plummeting level of foreign direct investment into Mongolia’s mineral sector between 
2011 and 2013 reflects a real perception among investors that the Mongolian government has 
succumbed to the temptation of protectionism, the antithesis of the values of free trade theory, 
                                                             
11 Minerals still dominated the export sector at 90.2%. See World Bank Group Mongolia, 2013: 8. 
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which prioritise market efficiency and the rule of law to protect contracts. While issues with 
other mining projects have also contributed (Els, 2013), the renegotiation of the OTIA and the 
halting of Oyu Tolgoi’s inaugural shipments of copper over allegations of tax evasion seriously 
compromised Mongolia’s reputation as a ‘safe’ destination for investment, reflected in the drop 
in FDI that occurred between 2011 and 2012. As Oyu Tolgoi has a particularly high profile 
because of the involvement of Rio Tinto, a leading multinational mining corporation, 
Mongolia’s negotiation of this particular project sets an important precedent for other interested 
investors. The negotiations leading up to the OTIA and the shifting approaches to the regulation 
of foreign investment in the minerals sector since 2001 has cast Oyu Tolgoi as the ‘litmus test’ 
(Falconer, 2013) for other investors. 
Institutions of investment and global development governance have adopted a similar 
perception as investors in terms of focusing on the strength of Mongolia’s institutions, 
reinforcing the “resource nationalist” image of the Mongolian government’s management of 
its mineral sector (Moody’s Investor Services, 2013; Adams, 2012). The global governance 
focus on Mongolia has zeroed in on its institutional reforms and political system (World Bank, 
2004; Isakova et al., 2012; World Bank Group Mongolia 2013); the terms and implementation 
of the OTIA itself, now that it is signed, do not feature widely in global governance reflections 
upon Mongolia’s anxiety about a resource trap as an emerging rentier economy. For example, 
the decision of the Mongolian government to delay Oyu Tolgoi’s first copper exports in June 
2013 was criticised by Moody’s Investor Service as it ‘“lowers investor confidence and 
underscores institutional weaknesses” in Mongolia’ (Moody’s Investor Services quoted in The 
Economist, 2013; Moody’s Investor Services, 2013).  
7. The Political Power of the “Resource Nationalism” Frame  
The perception of resource nationalism and weak institutions is only one way of thinking about 
the Mongolian government’s actions in relation to Oyu Tolgoi. Accusations of “resource 
nationalism” fail to take seriously the potential legitimacy of the Mongolian government’s 
concerns that the Oyu Tolgoi project, in practice, may not meet expectations for economic 
development. While Mongolia has adjusted its legal frameworks since the discovery of Oyu 
Tolgoi this is not necessarily a sign that the government does not take the rule of law seriously, 
remembering Jayasuriya’s problematisation of narrow definitions of the rule of law which 
insist on a negative relationship between the rule of law and governmental regulation 
(Jayasuriya, 1999).  
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Another way of framing the issue is to appreciate that the original 1997 Minerals Law reflected 
the neoliberal legal imagination of Mongolia’s post-communist transition (Rossabi, 2005; 
Ohnesorge, 2007; Bridge, 2004: 407). The inter-connected convergence of the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union with the Washington Consensus led to an ‘energetic neoliberalism’ 
(Ohnesorge, 2007: 243), which inspired a ‘substantive concern for free markets and limited 
government’ (Ohnesorge, 2007: 244) among policy advisors to countries emerging out of 
communism. This substantive12 turn is characterised by the need ‘to provide clear, predictable 
“rules of the game” within which private economic activity [could] take place’ (Ohnesorge, 
2007: 247). As Sneath (2003: 441-442) argues, this was perceived by transition advisors as 
critical to ‘”emancipate the economy from the political structure, and allow it to assume its 
latent “natural” form, composed of private property and the market.’ This approach has been 
rigorously critiqued since the end of the 1990s for ignoring the social impact of economic 
reforms in terms of poverty and the role of effective government regulation in preventing 
economic exploitation (Fritz, 2002: 75-76; Rossabi, 2005; Nixson and Walters, 2006; UNDP, 
2000; IMF, 2003). The recognised risks of a resource trap, the known dangers of corporate 
exploitation of developing countries’ natural resources and the established necessity of 
accumulating and using resource revenues for diversification and distribution all suggest that 
it is possible that Mongolia’s “re-regulation” of its mining sector following the discovery of 
Oyu Tolgoi has some legitimacy from a national development point of view. Even the former 
chief executive of Rio Tinto’s Oyu Tolgoi operations acknowledged that governments do have 
a regulative role in ‘making sure that businesses [meet] the standards the government desires 
for its country’ (McRae quoted in Bowler, BBC, 2013).   
Furthermore, while “resource nationalism” suggests misplaced government priorities, the 
willingness of the government to risk renegotiation of the OTIA and foreign direct investment 
could also be conceived as reflecting genuine responsiveness to the concerns of its domestic 
constituency. Mongolian NGOs, such as Oyu Tolgoi Watch, have urged the government to 
regain ‘balance’ (Dugersuren, Mongolian Mining Journal, 2012), arguing that the OTIA is in 
favour of the foreign investor’s interests. Campi (2012) argues that ‘all stakeholders, including 
the countryside and urban poor, have actively expressed their opinions via workshops, 
community groups, environmental protests, and in the vibrant Mongolian press.’ While there 
is evidence that political parties have used the redistribution of mineral rents to court the public 
                                                             
12 The author means substantive in the legal sense of the word, as ‘defining rights and duties, as opposed to 
giving the procedural rules by which those rights and duties are enforced’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014).  
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vote (IMF, 2012: 16), the establishment of the Citizens’ Hall in December 2009 following the 
signing of the OTIA, indicates there is at least some political will to engage in direct and 
deliberative democratic process with citizen concerns. Pomfret (2010: 155), a prominent 
scholar of Mongolia’s democracy, argues that while ‘Mongolia’s democracy can look chaotic, 
corrupt and incompetent when placed under a spotlight...in the big picture of economic policy, 
the democratic process has produced a consistent development strategy... in response to the 
will of the electorate.’  
Thus it is worth noting that while populist electoral politics have been widely critiqued (IMF, 
2013; Thomson Reuters, 2011; Walker, 2013; Gillies, 2010), the close attention and potentially 
high level of implicit political pressure upon Mongolia’s parliamentary and presidential 
electoral outcomes from foreign investors has yet to be problematised (The Economist, 2013; 
Pistilli, 2012). For example, a recent article in the Economist (The Economist, 2013) states that 
‘hopes run high that the Democratic Party’s victory will put an end to political squabbling over 
such projects [in reference to Oyu Tolgoi]... a new foreign-investment law has long been 
stalled.’ The article quotes incumbent President Elbegdorj, who was re-elected to the ‘relief’ 
of foreign investors, as promising that ‘in the coming autumn session of parliament, I hope you 
will have that law.’ The language of “political squabbling” suggests a low view of Mongolian 
democracy; furthermore, the response of the President to the “hopes” of foreign investors 
conveys the reality of a political competition between the agendas of significant portions of the 
domestic constituency and investors. While there is insufficient space to explore this tension 
here, the constitutional legitimacy of this political reality is an important question for Mongolia 
to discern in coming years.  
Significantly, in November 2013, the Mongolian parliament passed a revised Foreign 
Investment Law, which replaces the 1993 version of the law and SEFIL. The provisions of the 
new Foreign Investment Law signal a return, and also an expansion, of Mongolia’s post-
communist commitment to ‘international best practice’ (World Growth, 2009) when it comes 
to the treatment of FDI. Foreign and domestic investors are given the same treatment under the 
new law, taxation rates are stabilised, a wider range of tax and non-tax incentives are available 
to investors, and the government’s involvement is restricted. For example, foreign investment 
is not subject to approval requirements in what were previously considered nationally strategic 
areas under SEFIL; only foreign companies that are over 50% state-owned and investing at 
least 33% into minerals, communication or financial sectors – the former ‘strategic’ sectors – 
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must go through a government approval process (Hogan Lovells, 2013). The 2013 revisions to 
the Foreign Investment Law, which require a two thirds majority in parliament to overturn, are 
obviously intended to return confidence and stability to Mongolia’s investment climate (Diana, 
2013; Hogan Lovells, 2013; Kohn, 2013). The scope of the revisions and the associated 
scrapping of SEFIL reflect an underlying economic need to reassure investors that laws 
governing investment will be protected to a greater extent from domestic politics.  
8. Concluding Thoughts 
This article has purposed to introduce the dilemma and opportunity of Oyu Tolgoi considering 
the political balancing act of development priorities and foreign direct investment which the 
Mongolian government has to navigate. Unfortunately, this is no playground see-saw in light 
of the real risks of a resource trap. Sustained investment in infrastructure, the expansion of 
secondary economic industry such as manufacturing and the equitable distribution of mineral 
wealth remain critical to avoiding the skewing effects of mineral dependence on economic 
diversification and equitable distribution. While Rio Tinto maintains that the project will be 
profitable in the long-run (Kohn, 2012), there are basic but lingering questions as to who will 
profit the most, when Mongolia can expect to make substantial profits and how much these 
profits will be worth in light of Mongolia’s high levels of debt and trending pattern of pro-
cyclical spending. It is impossible to make any hard and fast conclusions about Mongolia’s 
emergence as a resource rich economy, given that Mongolia is very much in the midst of 
negotiating the terms of its transformation. However, the research presented in this article 
strongly suggests reconsideration of the current emphasis on treating Mongolia’s potential 
resource trap and the government’s navigation thereof as primarily symptomatic of “resource 
nationalism” and weak domestic institutions. Despite the cautionary advice of the World Bank 
to spend well rather than fast (World Bank Group Mongolia, 2013), the Mongolian government 
is in between a rock and a hard place, considering the urgent and large-scale infrastructural 
needs of Oyu Tolgoi. Problematising domestic politics and institutions without regard for the 
global political economy of foreign direct investment dangerously depoliticises and simplifies 
the complex implications of Oyu Tolgoi for Mongolia’s development.  
In this article, the author firstly delineated the development opportunity that Oyu Tolgoi posed 
for Mongolia following the socio-economic difficulties experienced during the 1990s. The 
discovery of the Oyu Tolgoi deposits in 2001 prompted a noticeable shift in Mongolia’s 
national development strategy based on heightened expectations of government revenue from 
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the project. Notably, the NDS also contains commitments to diversifying Mongolia’s industrial 
base and spreading the wealth derived from mineral extraction in an equitable manner to lift 
the country out of poverty. It seems that the Mongolia government recognised the importance 
of diversification and equitable distribution to prevent the potential trap of mineral dependence, 
reflected in the obligations placed upon the foreign investor in the OTIA to contribute to these 
goals and the introduction of institutions to save revenue. Most importantly, it is clear that 
Mongolia took up the challenge of revamping and reorienting its institutional and legal 
governance of the mineral sector to enable the country to maximise the opportunity of Oyu 
Tolgoi for long-term development. It is worth mentioning that these governance initiatives are 
no mean feat for the government, given that the regulation of the mineral sector had been 
seriously scaled back and mineral exploitation emphasised at the expense of diversification in 
the 1990s.  
The second half of the article featured a discussion of the key challenges facing the Mongolian 
government in terms of maximising its revenues from Oyu Tolgoi and creating a fiscal 
stabilisation framework to sustain infrastructure and welfare investments through volatile 
commodity price swings. Mongolia’s financial obligations as a stakeholder in Oyu Tolgoi were 
linked to the Mongolian government’s pattern of pro-cyclical fiscal spending and rising debt 
levels. Given that Mongolia can only gain dividends from Oyu Tolgoi once its debt has been 
repaid to Rio Tinto, the Mongolian government has become increasingly concerned about cost 
overruns incurred by Rio Tinto and the U.S. $5.1 billion required to finance the second phase 
of the mine. While it is too late to renegotiate the OTIA, the Mongolian government took action 
to protect taxation revenues from alleged evasion and attempted to delay the first shipments of 
copper from Oyu Tolgoi in June 2013. Attempts to renegotiate the OTIA and allegations of tax 
evasion have had little impact on Rio Tinto; while the first shipments of copper were delayed 
at the government’s request, Mongolia’s revenue is equally, if not more, adversely impacted 
by this decision, evidenced in the dramatic drop in FDI in Mongolia’s mineral sector in 2012 
and 2013. It seems that the Mongolian government’s bargaining power and expectations for 
the profitability of Oyu Tolgoi in the short to medium term have been overly optimistic (Ognon, 
2013), raising doubts over the levels of diversification and distribution that can be achieved to 
keep Mongolia’s development agenda safe from the resource trap.  
Finally, the author raised some deeper questions about the legitimacy of the political influence 
of investors, particularly given the concerns of a significant portion of the Mongolian voting 
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constituency about the viability of Oyu Tolgoi. It is too early to make any strong conclusions, 
but the introduction of the 2013 Investment Law and the scrapping of SEFIL suggests that 
investors may be having an undue influence on Mongolia’s democratic process as they push 
for a concept of the rule of law which favours their own interests. The domestic governance of 
Mongolia’s mineral sector now has the ambitious task of managing volatile mineral markets in 
a way that avoids the trap of investing in one resource yet continuing to attract foreign 
investment in that very resource. In a recent interview with Al Jazeera (2012), President 
Elbegdorj urges investors to view Mongolia as,  
A rainbow-coloured economy... now Mongolia’s economy is mostly one colour and we would like 
to have more colours. Do not see Mongolia as a single mining business country... Mongolia can be a 
great hub between Russia and China in this region, an infrastructural hub, a financial hub, [a] high-
tech hub... We have the potential.   
Whether Mongolia has the potential or not currently relies a great deal on the interests of the 
investors and the capacity of the government to incentivise that interest in constructive 
directions. At the moment, investment interest in Mongolia is one-sidedly focused on the 
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